of the contemporary food regime, which highlights the contradictions and logic of capital (e.g. Burch and Lawrence 2009; McMichael 2013) .
The attention to the greater role of private financial actors in the food system has brought forward important insights on the emergence of financialisation in relation to the dynamics of capitalist development. At the same time, however, there has been relatively less attention paid to the ways in which these actors have historically played a role in the food system and their relationship with the state (Clapp and Helleiner 2012) . A longer view highlights the critical role of the state in mediating the relationship between agriculture and finance. Helleiner has used this longer view to show how states are critical to the globalisation of finance (Helleiner 1994) . In the realm of food and agriculture, private capital has historically been reluctant to invest without assurances and support from the state, and states have practiced varying degrees of regulation on private financiers in the sector at different times.
Over the course of the past century, states in both rich and poor countries have at times taken a proactive role in supporting farmers, a critical political force who were not always well served by private finance. In the first part of the 20 th century, today's advanced industrialised states established institutions to provide farm credit, offered financial support and enacted regulations designed to limit the influence of private financial actors specifically over agricultural commodity markets. Many of these types of measures were replicated in developing countries in the 1960s and 70s. In recent decades, with the rise of the neoliberal economic model that both states and private financial actors supported, many states have scaled back the protections and institutions that supported farmers and relaxed regulations that once reined in private financial actors in the sector. A number of states have also begun to invest in agriculture via private financial markets and new financial tools.
This article outlines the contours of these historical trends and discusses their implications for present-day financialisation in the food sector. In the first section, we examine the role of the state as provider of agricultural credit for production and stable institutions for agricultural marketing. In section two, we highlight the role of the state in regulating private financial actors in agricultural commodity exchange markets. The third section looks at the ways in which these state-backed institutions and regulations have been re-shaped by states in recent decades, giving the upper hand to private financial actors in the agricultural sector. It is important to recognise the state's role as a regulator and in shaping institutions for finance, even if that role has been heavily influenced by private financial actors themselves (Barth, Caprio and Levine 2012) . We argue that the state's role in these different trends over time has important implications for the practices of contemporary financialisation. Whereas the state has taken explicit measures to ensure that agriculture was supported by finance at various times, more recently states have instead ensured that financial markets were supported by agriculture. The state, through its various interventions at the intersection of agriculture and finance, has shaped the conditions that today make agriculture an attractive site for investment by private financial actors. This shift has had important consequences for farmer livelihoods and agricultural sustainability. It remains to be seen whether agriculture will remain attractive to private financial investors as the state institutional legacy weakens and market turmoil continues apace.
Early Approaches to Agricultural Credit and Marketing
Historically, the modern state in rich countries has played an important role in creating institutions to support industrialised models of agriculture1 (Chang 2009; Friedmann 1982; Finegold 1982; Gilbert and Howe 1991) . At the same time, agrarian movements have pushed the state to develop unique forms of financial regulation and legislation in the US and Canada (Carney 2011; Prasad 2012; Sanders 1999; Winson 1992 (Chang 2009; Booth, 1928) . In the US and Canada, cooperative marketing organisations and credit unions were actively supported by farmer groups who pressured politicians to enact state regulations and provide credit (Booth 1928; Winson 1992) .
Agricultural commodity trade expanded as exporting countries marketed grain surpluses around the globe through export financing and subsidies. Canada and Australia established marketing boards to manage commodity trade of grains, in part to restrict the manipulation of grain markets and to provide stable prices and orderly marketing for exports, while also offering credit to importing countries (Turner 1949; Grogan 1948) . Farmers and commodity trading interests of exporting countries benefitted from these supports, but farmers in importing countries had to compete with 'dumped' commodities, which were sometimes given in the form of food aid (Clapp 2012b) .
A number of events occurred during the 1980s-1990s that brought an end to the relatively stable post WWII commodity markets. The International Commodity Agreements began to unravel along with many state marketing boards and trading enterprises. The commodity agreements were established to secure stability in commodity markets after World War II (Corea 1991) , and marketing boards helped to provide orderly and stable marketing of agricultural commodities. In addition, the end of the Soviet Union opened up space for new market arrangements. At that time and the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund pressured countries to adopt structural adjustment policies which ended or curtailed state support of agriculture such as the subsidisation of inputs and credit and the disbandment of state marketing boards (Clapp 1997) . Critics claimed that the subsidy programmes were inefficient, and ultimately harmed small farmers (Bates 2005) .
Regulating Finance and Commodity Exchanges
The link between financial investors and trade in agricultural commodities has a long history. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries commodity exchanges created fungible agricultural commodities through a combination of technological innovation and state and market regulation (Cronon 1992) . Futures exchanges for agricultural commodities were established in London in the eighteenth century and in the US in the nineteenth century in part as an outcome of globalised trade. These markets provided a means by which buyers and sellers of contracts could purchase and sell agricultural commodities for delivery at a date in the future, and could hedge their risks against the uncertainty of agricultural production and long-distance trade. Over the course of the mid to late nineteenth century, the practice of agricultural futures trading for grains became widespread in the US and later in Canada.
Private speculative capital has long been active in agricultural commodity marketing and trade, even prior to formalised commodity exchanges, and in turn it has been a contested site.
Speculation is a trade based on the prediction of price movements with the uncertain possibility of a reward. As a result, 'futures' trading has been likened to gambling. However, proponents state that commodity exchanges centralise and organise markets, commercialise agriculture and provide services such as price information, and risk protection (Hieronymus 1977; Irwin and Sanders 2012 ).
Farmers and farmer organisations have historically been distrustful and highly critical of commodity exchanges because non-agricultural interests have used futures to manipulate prices and markets. Taking these concerns into consideration, several US states had banned futures trading outright in the late 19 th century. But despite some curbs on financial speculation in commodity markets, futures trade grew and eclipsed the physical trade of commodities in centers free of restrictions such as Chicago (Cowing 1957 Futures Act required all futures transactions to take place on approved exchanges, and outlawed manipulation of the market. Large market traders were required by law to report daily on their market positions, which helped to curtail manipulation and increase transparency on futures markets. The Commodity Exchange Act limited the number of futures contracts that speculators were legally allowed to own at any one time. The 1933 Glass-Steagall Act regulated banking and bank speculation, including their involvement in commodity markets. The aim of these various regulations was not to outlaw financial speculation on these markets, and indeed agricultural 'end users' that traded on these markets for hedging purposes -primarily grain traders, farmers' co-operatives, food processors and large ranchers -were exempted from these regulations.
Rather, the regulations sought to prevent 'excessive' speculation that might result in market manipulation and sudden sharp price shifts (Clapp and Helleiner 2012) .
Commodity exchanges drew little interest from critical food studies scholars after World War II because they were highly regulated by the state and agricultural exporting states were providing marketing support through various state marketing institutions and programmes.
Proponents claim that during this time commodity exchanges faced 'near extinction' (Irwin 2012 : np) as a result of this regulation. However, a number of regulatory changes, starting in the 1970s marked the revival of commodity exchanges and the start of a 'golden age' for futures markets (Irwin 2012: np) .
States and the Reformation of the Agriculture-Finance Sphere
Although the intention of the above state interventions was to support agricultural development broadly, these measures in practice often favoured large-scale farmers and agricultural trading interests, the latter of which have played a complex role as both farm interests and financial players. More recently, there has been a systematic reduction in the role of the state in the agricultural finance sphere that has benefited private financial actors and larger farming interests at the expense of small-scale farmers (Fairbairn 2014 , Isakson 2014 . The most visible of these changes was the reform of government-run marketing boards which have been effectively privatised, including in Canada and Australia as well as in many developing countries. Most experts expected that with the state marketing boards out of the way, the private sector would step in to set up new marketing arrangements such as country specific agricultural commodity exchanges. Thus far, there has been little uptake. Banks and financiers were reluctant to fund the export of commodities without the state-backed institutions securing the loans in developing countries that lost their marketing boards (Varangis and Larson 1996) . In addition, the privatization of the Australian Wheat Board, and more recently the Canadian Wheat Board, has meant that farmers who previously counted on the marketing board to help market grain are now expected to turn to commodity exchanges and large grain traders for marketing assistance and risk management (Cryderman, 2013) . In turn, there are indications that small and mid-size producers will lose with these new marketing arrangements (Magnan 2011) State-backed credit provision has also undergone change in recent decades. Rich Before structural adjustment programmes were widely adopted in the 1980s-90s, statemarketing boards in developing countries would often provide credit to manage commodity trade risk. Financing commodity trade and commodity-related projects exposes the lender to price risks, since the borrower's ability to repay the loan largely depends on future commodity prices.
It is risky because volatile commodity prices can mean that the value of a shipment can change dramatically between when the commodities are sold and when they are received. As the state's role in commodity trade shifted with structural adjustment, the risks remained and private capital was unwilling to step in. Commodity exchanges, in theory provided derivative instruments such as futures contracts, which could be used to manage these risks. The World Bank encouraged governments to access to derivative markets and risk management tools in order to 'solve public sector problems,' explaining how a handful of developing states used commodity derivatives.
Mexico, for example, set up a state agency to hedge commodity prices on the New York Cotton
Exchange (Larson, Varangis and Yabuki 1998: 2) . The offering of such advice by multilateral aid agencies shows how states began to look to new kinds of financial instruments to manage and facilitate commodity marketing problems. However, commodity exchanges have high transaction costs (IFC 2011), which means only organizations and groups with large amounts of capital can benefit from participating in these marketing arrangements.
The shifting regulatory context for finance in recent decades also had implications for agricultural commodity trading, bringing lighter regulations and more harmonisation between the US and the EU. Although tight regulations on the agricultural commodity futures trade had been in place in the US for over 50 years, those rules were relaxed in the 1980s and 1990s, enabling banks to increasingly sell new financial products linked to agricultural commodities (Ghosh 2010; Clapp and Helleiner 2012) . Banks requested and were granted 'no action letters' that enabled them to exceed previously set position limits, which enabled them to sell new financial derivative products 'over the counter' (OTC) (Clapp and Helleiner 2012) . The Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 explicitly prohibited the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, the US regulatory body that oversees commodity exchange markets, to regulate OTC derivatives (Tett 2009 ). This change brought the US regulatory approach more into line with the European regulation of commodity markets, which only had light regulations that also did not oversee the OTC markets (Tilburg and Vander Stichele 2011) . (Worthy 2011: 13) . In the coffee market it is estimated that 1kg coffee is traded 8000 times over in speculative trade (Breger Bush 2012: 40) . Investors also bought into new financial investment products linked to farmland acquisition (See Fairbairn, this issue).
Heightened and excessive speculation in the sector can result in increased volatility in agricultural and land prices, which results in hardships both for consumers and for farmers, the latter of which do not necessarily benefit when prices rise, because volatility introduces greater uncertainties and complicates planning (FAO 2011) . Investments linked to farmland acqusition in developing countries have been associated in many cases with loss of land rights for small scale producers and ecological impacts of the introduction of large-scale industrial agricultural production, as we have seen in the case of land acquisitions for biofuel operations (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010; McMichael 2010) . Large agricultural trading interests, however, have benefited from these changes, as they increasingly joined financial institutions in offering agricultural commodity derivative products to investors (Murphy et al. 2012 ).
The main investors in these new agricultural commodity derivatives products are largescale institutional investment funds that are seeking to gain exposure to commodity markets.
Governments have taken a role in such investments via pension funds and sovereign wealth funds, alongside private investors such as insurance companies, mutual funds and foundation endowments. Large-scale investors such as these tend to make long-term passive investment interests. This shift only reinforces the short-term incentives that typically drive decisions in the financial sector and which often run counter to long-term sustainability goals (Helleiner 2011 ).
More strictly regulated financial markets on their own are not necessarily sufficient for sustainability in the agricultural sector, as the ecological effects of agricultural industrialisation in the 20 th century have shown (Weis 2010) . But weak financial regulations that encourage private speculative investments in the sector have spurred appropriation of new landscapes into industrial production and the externalisation of ecological and social costs that are associated with it, which only exacerbate efforts to promote sustainability in the sector (see Clapp, forthcoming) . Greater oversight of financial market activity in the sector is an important component of building more sustainable agrarian livelihoods and food systems, alongside stronger policies for environmental protection.
Conclusion
In this current period of heightened financialisation, much of the attention has focused on the role of private financial actors and their rationale for engaging more actively in the agricultural sector. Financialisation is seen as part of the logic of capitalism as it seeks to reap profits on a range of economic activities, including agriculture. As we have shown in this article, putting this current period into a longer historical context reveals that the state has played an important role in shaping the contours of contemporary financialisation of food. The modern state in rich countries was instrumental in creating institutions to support agriculture, including the provision of credit and other supports to farmers who otherwise would not have received it, albeit unevenly. States also actively regulated the actions of private financial actors in commodity markets as a means to protect farmers and stabilise incomes. Recent decades have seen the earlier institutions reshaped, alongside the deregulation of finance in ways that have important implications for food and agriculture. Although it appears that finance is operating on its own capitalist logic, it is important to recognise that its context for doing so has been strongly shaped by the state.
The mediating role of states between finance and agriculture over the course of the past century has in many ways laid the groundwork that made the sector particularly attractive to private financial actors in recent decades. The state, in other words, was crucial in creating the conditions not only for stable markets, but also for the industrialisation of agriculture and the development of global agricultural value chains by securing commodity trade. Once these trends were firmly established, private capital became more interested in investing in all stages of the agricultural sector, rather than simply capitalizing on commodity market price shifts at the very end of the production process.
States may have been influenced by private financial actors in recent decades, but they also played a key role in encouraging those actors to take a lead and this shift has resulted in a number of consequences. The stability that states brought to the sector via credit provision and regulations has been removed just as states handed private finance the freedom to play a bigger role in the sector. The recent volatility on agricultural markets can be seen in this context, and it is unclear whether private financial actors will remain interested in the sector given the high degree of risk and uncertainty that encouraged states to become more involved a century ago. It is entirely possible that the current market volatility and degraded ecological base will lead private financial actors to ultimately withdraw from the sector, and the state may be called upon to step back in to stabilise it. The longer, historical view provided here gives some perspective, and enables us to see that it is not necessarily inevitable that private sector actors will voluntarily seek to dominate this sector if the state does not create the conditions that make it profitable, not just in the short term, but also in the long term. States may have shaped the interests of private finance in the sector, but with the withdrawal of the state, that interest may fade in the context of market turmoil and ecological degradation.
